A comparative study of U.S. and Canadian broadcasting regulation.
Introduction
In an era of deregulation, which may affcct the rcgulation of broadcasting in Canada, it is appropriate to consider whcthcr in any rcspccts thc rcgulation of broadcasting may itself be irnpugncd by the Canadian Chartcr of Rightsand Frecdorns. The Charterbecamc part of the Constitution of Canada on April 17.1982. Of particular rclevancc to the regulation of broadcasting is section 2(b), which reads as follows:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: .......... (b) freedom of thought. belief, opinion and expression including freedom of the press and other media of communication.
If any provisions of the Broadcasting Act, or of regulations under thc Act, are inconsistent with section 2(b). it is thcn necessary to turn to section 52(c) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that the Constitution of Canada (including the Charter) is "the supreme Law of Canada" and that any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to theextent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect (Constitution Act, 1982, sec. 52 (1) ).
In the course of considering the potential impact of the guarantee contained in section 2@), it will be necessary to refer to American constitutional law, and in particular the First Amendment guarantee of "freedom of speech". This is not because the interpretation of the American constitution is conclusive on.what the interpretation of a similar guarantee in the Canadian Charter should be. Indeed, it is clear from judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada that structural and contextual differences article in Advance in Telemarics. Vol. 1 , forthcoming. 1988. between the Charter and the American Constitution require caution and restraint by canadian judges when referring to decisions of Amcrican courts interpreting their constitution. It is nevertheless also m e that judgments of the Supreme Court of Cam& interpreting rights and frcedoms guaranteed by the Charter have not hesitated to refer to American doctrines, sometimes relying upon them and at other times distinguishing them. Among the questions to be asked are some that are politically sensitive and jeopardise the rationales of broadcast regulations that many Canadians hold dear. TO focus the light of the Charter upon them is not to advocate abandonment of such regulation. Students of communications policy. no less than lawyers and judges, should be capable of dispassionate analysis of the implications of our recent constitutional reform.
Section 2(b) of The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Before proceeding with the analysis of the effect of the Charter, it is necessary to refer bricfly to some aspects of the origins and history of broadcast regulation in both Canada and the Unitcd Statcs.
In the Unitcd Smtcs the fcdcml regulatory agency since 1934 has been the Fcdcnl Communications Commission (FCC). In Canada, from 1936 to 1958 thc Board of Governors of thc Canadian Broadcasting Corporation regulated not only the radio and television stations which werc owncd and opcrated by it, but also privately-owned stations whether or not they were affiliated with h e CBC networks. Since 1958 there has been a regulatory agcncy indcpcndcnt of the CBC, that regulates all broadcasters; since 1968 the agcncy has been called either the Canadian Radio and Television Commission or (since 1976) the Canadian Radio-television and Tclccommunications Commission (CRTC).
Bo~h coun~ries bccame parties to the International Radio Telegraph Convention, 1927. This maty assigned frcqucncics among thc signatory states. The obligations assumed by parties to this treaty necessitated regulation by statute. The governments of both counlries, faccd wi~h chaos resulting from unregulaled use of radio frequencies, sought to devise a system of rcgulation that would prevent signal interference among broadcaster's. It was then generally bclieved that radio frequencies were a scarce resource. As we shall see, it has been argued recenlly that this was a misconception.
Thcre are two distinctive fcatures of the Canadian broadcasting system: first, the existence of a strong publicly-owned component in Canadian broadcasting, and, second, regulations applicable to both public and private broadcasters, that require a specified minimum proportion of Canadian programming content. These characteristics do not reflect a lesser Canadian commitment to the liberal economic hiition or to a capitalist form of mixed economy than is the case in the United States. Rather, these features are a product of Canadian governmental policies from the 1930s Onward, which have had as their goal the use of broadcasting as an instrument of "ational unity and national identity. The objective has been to prcvcnt Canada from becoming culturally and ultimately politically dependent upon the United States. Throughout the decades since the 1930s there have been concerns for political sovereignty, and fears that market forces, if left unregulated, would bring about the complete domination of Canadian communications by American enterprise. A Canadian historian has explained the effect of these concerns and fears as follows:
This national consideration, this desire for political sovereignty, leads to policies and actions that are influenced by other factors: geographic, economic, cultural, and demographic, that in turn lend distinctiveness to the legislation, b e types of regulation, and the mixture of public and private ownership so characteristic of the Canadian system (Peers, 1983: 29) .
The language of section 2(b) of the Canadian Chartcr is broadcr than that of the American Fist Amendment, which states: "Congress shall make no laws ... abridging the freedom of speech, orof the press ...". Despite the diffcrcnccs between the wording of the United Sutes' Fist Amendment and that of section 2(b) oftheCanadian Chartcr, some assistance in the interpretation of the Charter's provision can likcly bc gained from American cases. For example, the he between frcedom of spccch and the "marketplace of idcas" was reflected in a judgment of Justicc Olivcr Wcndcll Holmes Jr., in 1919. He argued that, rather than prohibiting even seditious pamphlcteering, the ultimate good dcsired is bettcr reached by free trade in ideas -that the best test of truth is thc power of thc thought to gct itsclf accepted in the competition of thc markct ...(A bram v. United States, 250 U.S., 1919). This, then, is thc "markctplacc of idcas" approach.
A second ~hcory is that "freedom of communication is also available in a democratic society because such a society is based on self-governance on an informed citizenry that will intelligently elcct its representatives" (Frarklin, 1981: 19-20 The court decidcd that a gencnl direction given to the CRTC by Order in Council pursuant to a provision in the Broadcasting Act rcstrictcd the authority of the CRTC to issue or renew a broadcasting liccncc to persons who owned or controlled newspapers circulating in the arca scrvcd by the broadcaster. The court held that the direction did not violate scction 2(b) of the Charter. Conscqucntly the CRTC's rcnewal of a broadcasting licence to a company that fell within the direction, for a shorter period than would normally have bccn thc case, was hcld to bc valid. The dccision itsclf may be c o m t ; this is not the place to consider it. It is the reasons that were givcn that are of inwrest beyond the spccific facts of the case.
The reasoning of the dccision turned on a provision in the Broadcasting Act which declares that "broadcasting undcrtakings in Canada make use of radio frequencies that are public propcrty ..." The Corn held that denial of a broadcasting licence does not violate "frecdom of expression", for, the court said, section 2(b) gives no right to use someone else's land or platform to make a speech, nor to use someone else's printing press to publish his idcas, nor to enter and use a public building for such purposes, nor to use radio frcquenccs which are public property. Consequently an applicant for a broadcasting licence does not have a right to such a licence, and the rest of the public does not have a right to a broadcasting service to be provided by the applicant. Moreover, Chicf Justice Thurlow said. the licensee's "freedom to broadcast what it wishes to communicate would not be denied by the refusal of a licence to operate a broadcasting undertaking"; the licensee "would have the same freedom as anyone else to air its information by purchasing time on a licensed station."
The New Brunswick Broadcasting judgment assumes. without any discussion of the purpose of section 2(b) of the Charter, that the Charter does not reach into public buildings or public facilities of any kind. It assumes further that when Parliament dcclrucs propcny to be public which previously was not, the reach of the Charter can thercby bc impeded. Doubts may be entertained as to the validity of both assumptions. partly in the light of American decisions which have extended First Amendment protection to a number of public and quasi-public forums. and partly with the bench1 of a more recent Canadian decision as to freedom of expression in a public airport. In that case, also a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. (Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. The Queen, Jan 30,1987) the majority, in holding that "freedom of expression" protected the right of political pamphleteers to propagandize at the Dorval Airport, made no mention of the New Bruwick Broadcasting reasoning. If the majority judges had considcrcd it to be correcl, as did two dissenting judges, they would surely have said so. The reasoning in the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, in so far as it is based on the "propcny" issue. is thcrcfore of doubtful status even in the Fedcral Court of Appeal.
It may moreover be argued that the approach takcn in the decision in the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, in effect treating all publicly owned facilities as king completely beyond the compass of scction 2@) of the Charlcr, does not rcflcct thc kind of large, libcral or gencrous intcrprctation of scction 2(b) that the Suprcmc Court of Canada has said should mark thc courts' approach to thc Charter What of the point taken by Chicf Justicc Thurlow. that a would-bc broadcasting licensee dcnicd a liccncc can purchase broadcast timc from a successful liccnscc? If broadcasting frcqucncics wcrc unlimited, as thc ability to produce a ncwspaper is thought u> be in the scnsc that anyone with suflicicnt capital can physically do so, would such an argument bc considered seriously? Imagine such reasoning bcing applied to the statutory licensing of newspapers. It is hard to bclicve that. if a law permitted the refusal of a licence to print a newspapcr bccausc thc proprictor operated a broadcasting station in ~h c same area, any weight would bc givcn to a justification on the basis that the proprietor could purchase space in a newspapcr that is liccnscd. What the International Covenant describes as the "freedom to seek, receive and impart information", applied to the Charter as mcaning that scction 2(b) "protects both spcakcr and listcncr" (Regina v. Reid, Jan 14, 1988 (Alberta Court of Appeal)) is arguably offcndcd by a licensing systcm in cithcr case. To recognizc this is not to advocate a conclusion that the system of licensing of broadcasting stations is invalid on constitutional grounds. We mcrely advance this point: even if "frcedom of opinion" and "freedom of expression" contain inhcrcnt limits to bc found in "the historical origins of the concepts enshrined (Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.(1985) S.CR. 295, p. 344 (Supreme Court of Canada)) in section 2(b) (such as rulcs of law prohibiting mischievous or defamatory utterances (Regina v. Reid supra. 1988), it is quite arguable that a system of licensing offends the constitutional guarantee. If that wcre held to be so, any and all legislativeenacmcnts designed to furthcr public policies in regard to broadcasting in Canada would not necessarily be constitutionally invalid. For, assuming that some aspect of the statutory licensing scheme violated section 2(b), it might still be salvaged if it satisfied the standards exacted by section 1 of the Charter as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Oakes.((l986). 1 S.C.R. 103).
Some Implications of Section 2(b) of the Canadian ~harter'of ~i~h t s and Freedoms for the Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada
The foundation upon which any attack on the statutory regulation of radio and television broadcasting would have to be based is the "freedom of expression" guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter, which has alrcady been quoted in full. The discussion which follows assumes, contrary to the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, that certain aspects of the Broadcasting Act or re ylations made under it violate section 2@). If the Act in any way violates section 2(b) regulation could only be sustained by the provisions of section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 has no equivalent in the American Constitution. In the Unitcd States. limits to rights and freedoms that are found in the Bill of Righrs havc been created and dcfined by judicial decisions. In Canada, on the othcr hand, section 1 of thc Charter provides the cxclusive critcria for the justification of limits on rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by the Charter. It reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the righls and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can bc demons~rably justified in a frce and democratic society."
In Oakes. the Suprcmc Court authoritatively laid down the following propositions to govcm the intcrprctation of scction 1: Two "central criteria" must be satisfied to establish that a limit is protected by section 1. Thcy refer to the objective of the limit, and to the means chosen to attain that objective. As for the objective, it is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.
As for the means chosen to attain the objective, it must be shown that they arc reasonable and dcmonsvably justified. This involves a form of proportionality test' of which Lhcre are three components:
(i) First, the measures adoptcd must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considcrations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective.
(ii) Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question ...
(iii) Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified a of 'sufficient importance'.
In support of the system of regulation established by the Broadcasting Act, if it were held that the system itself infringes section 2 0 ) "frcedom of expression", the government would likely have little difficulty in persuading a court to agree. A major objective of this statute -the avoidance of technological chaos. After all the statute relates to what in Oakes were described as "concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society". In the absence of such a system of regulation, the right of listeners and viewers to have the benefit of the "marketplace of ideas" would be impaired. Moreover, without such a licensing syswm, Canada would be unable to comply with its international obligations. Assuming that the very system of licensing meets the O a k s test, the technical aspect of the regulatory system would then have to meet the three-part "proportionality test" which Oakes imposes when the "means chosen" to attain the objective are assessed under section 1. The system of licensing is surely rationally connected to the objective. As to whether the system of licensing, as it is applied by the regulatory agency, impairs freedom of expression "as little as possible", and whether there is "a proportionality" between the effects of the licensing system and the objectives of avoiding domestic and international chaos, these questions merit more attention than space permits.
An important kind of regulation by the CRTC governs the extent to which the liccnscc's programs must contain "Canadian contcnt". Since 1959 the CRTC and its prcdcccssor have made regulations that have varicd in the course of time as to details, but essentially require a certain proportion of broadcast time to be of "Canadian content". The rust question is whether such rules, even though they do not resmct the content of any specific programs. nevertheless violate section 2(b). It is well established that, apart from any constitutional imperatives that may arise from the provisions of the Charter. the power given by section 16(b)(ix) of the Broadcasting Act to the CRTC to make regulations "respecting such other matters as it deems necessary for the furtherance of its objectives", gives the Commission power to regulate broadcasting content The Commission has in fact regulated such content in various ways, some of which will now be discussed. Section 3(d) of the roadc casting Act "declares" that the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be varied and comprehensive ... programming about Canadian affairs and to cause Canadian ralent to be used, thus enhancing the consciousness of Canadian listeners and viewers of the heritage and identity of the Canadian nation. These objectives have been regarded as elements of the cornerstone of Canadian broadcasting policy since the 1930s. A nation-state is not likely to survive as a society that is "free" in the sense of being sovereign and independent of other nations, unless it is culturally autonomous and its citizens share a knowledgeable pride in their heritage. Bearing in mind the pervasiveness of American television programs and popular music that threaten continually to swamp English Canah's airwaves, a court would likely conclude that the objectives of the Canadian-content regulations relate to "concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society". As to the means chosen to achieve the objective, and whether such regulations satisfy the three-part O d e s proportionality test, many broadcasters might argue vigorously that the regulations are overly broad, unduly impair freedom of expression, and lack proportionality. Aregulation which prescribes fhat a certain proportion of broadcast time be devoted to Canadian content is, of course. merely one way of framing a rule that might have been drafted in terms of a maximum of so much time being devoted to foreign content.
Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada and U.SJD. Zolf
Evcn if section 2(b) were to be limited to the protection of the expression of information and opinion in regard to political mattcrs, it could be argucd that the rcgulation inhibits Canadian tclcvision networks from importing American ind other forcign programming on news and public affairs, bccause Canadian broadcastcrs are morc likely to want to use as much of the importcd contcnt time for popular cntertainmcnt programs that an: appealing to advertisers. If such is a consequence of Lhc Canadian contcnt regulations, thcn thcre is, in the result, a reduction of the ability of Canadians to benefit from programs about world affairs or even about domestic affairs in other leading democracies. There is an impairment of the "frcedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers" that is protected by Article 19(2) of the International Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights to which Canada is a party. Moreover, thc Canadian contcnt rules may be disproportionate in theirrcsltictions on Canadian broadcastcrs' frccdom of expression, in view of the cmcrgencc of Amcrican dircct-to-homc satcllitcs capablc of dclivcring American programs dircct to Canadian homes, apmmcnt buildings and hotcls wilhout bcing subjcct, at prcscnt. to any Canadian contcnt rcgulation. The morc Canadians tune in to such Amcrican satcllitc programs, thc lcss cffcctivc arc thc Canadian contcnt rulcs in funhcring thcir objective, whilc at the same time impairing thc frccdom of Canadian broadcastcrs. rcguhtions known as the "fairness doctrine". These regulations require broadcasting stations to providc discussion of public issues, fair covcrage of each side of an issue, and a right of reply by persons attacked on a station. The Court unanimously supported a limited right of access to the broadcasting media. Spwking for the Court. Justice White found that access would "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press."
The inconsistency between the Court's approach to the print media and its approach to broadcasting stations is apparent. In the one case the Court rejected governmental regulation of a private newspaper's content; in the other the Court supported governmental regulation of a broadcasting station's programme content Thc difference can bc explained, if at all, by Red Lion's emphasis on "the scarcity of broadcast frcqucncies and the legitimateclaims of those unable wilhout govcmmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views." The last part of this reasoning, if applied to the Miami I-lerald case, would have supported a governmentally guaranteed "fair access" to a newspapcr's columns, but the reasoning was not applied to produce that result. There is, in consequence, an unresolved inconsistency of principle in these two Supreme Court decisions.
Although in Canada the CRTC has no regulations comparable to the FCC regulations which have been known as the "fairness doctrine", section 3(d) of the Canadian Broadcasting Act itself states: (d) the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be varied and comprehensive and should provide reasonable, balancd opportunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public concern, and the programming provided by a c h broadcaster should be of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources:
This provision is pcrhaps unclear as to whether the obligation to "provide reasonable, balanced opponunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public concern" applies only to the system as a whole, or is also to be exacted of a particular broadcaster. If it applies to the latter, there may be a limit on the freedom of expression guaranteed by section 2(b), and if so it would be necessary to scrutinize that limit in the form of a section 1 analysis. In the United States, the fairness doctrine and the very regulation of broadcasting are based on the assumption that there is a spectrum scarcity. Thus, as far as "fairness" is concerned, a person desiring to reply to an attack would not in reality be able to reply unless the broadcaster were required to broadcast it, so that a balanced presentation of issues would be received by listeners and viewers.
The attitude of Americans to deregulation of the broadcasting industry, beginning with the deregulation of cable distribution, is closcly related to their continued acceptance or their rejection of the theory of spectrum scarcity. Those persons, like a previous chairman of the FCC, Charles D. Ferris, who continue to espouse the theory of spectrum scarcity (at l a s t in the case of off-air signals), support the fairnessdoctrine and oppose deregulation of program content (Ferris and Kirkland, 1985-86 contend that the theory of spectrum scarcity, if it ever was valid, no longer is. They argue that the fairness doctrine should beabolished. Effective January 1,1988 t h e F C~ agrccd to this interpretation and supports the deregulation of program content.
Competition to over-the-air broadcasting from new media has led to an awareness that traditional broadcasting is just one of many information dclivcry systems. Technological plenty is forcing a widespread reconsideration of the role competition can play in broadcasting regulation. And regulators and others have become increasingly aware that regulatory processes have infringed the first amendment rights of broadcasters without a sufficiently compclling constitutional justification (Fowler and Brenner, 1982: 209) .
He alleged that the "original electromagnetic sin" occurred when "Conpess reserved a portion of the spectrum (and, in fact. not a very large portion in terms of the frequencies that could be used for broadcasting) for radio and later television." As for present conditions, he rejected "the belief that a condition of true scarcity prevails in broadcasting" and asserted:
Scarcity is a relative concept even when applied to the limited specuurn earmarked for broadcast use. Additional channels can be addcd, without increasing the portion reserved for broadcast, by dccrmsing the bandwidth of each channcl. Technology is an independent variable that makes scarcity a relative concept. At some point, quality bccornes so reduced or costs so grcat that new channels should not be addcd. But until that point is reached, satunuon of the spectrum has not occurred. The continued evolution of speclrum efficiency makes it difficult to say with certainty that saturation of channels will ever be permanent in any market (Fowler and Brenner, 1982:222 ).
Fowler's arguments supporting the abandonment of the theory of spectrum scarcity lack persuasiveness. Considerations of space prevent their detailed analysis here. Briefly, however, it can be argued that it is unrealistic to say that spectrum scarcity is overcome by ethnological changes which require massive investment by broadcasters and consumers. Furthermore the existence of a scarcity of one means of expression is not diminished by the availability of news and information through other distribution tcchnologics such as videos, newspapers, magazines and other media Supporters of cxtcnsivc broadcast regulation in Canada would probably be shocked if a mandatory duty of "fairness" or "balance" were adopted in regard to the print media under a statute governing the press. But the question must, however, be posed as it has been posed in the United States: is there a valid ground of distinction between the two media in terms of the application of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression? One possible ground is the doctrine of spectrum scarcity. If that theory is not a sufficient basis for the differentiation, justification might be sought in what has been called the "impact theory", or in the notion that the constitutional guarantee is designed to further the social goal of "diversity of views". The "impact theory" would argue that broadcasting has a morc persuasive impact on thc lives of Canadians than do the print media. In the words of an American commentator adaptcd to the Canadian context: This rationalc corrclatcs to the power theory. The power theory postulates that because thc broadcast mcdium is the source of a majority of [Canada's] ncws, regulation must ensure that it promotc the common good ... To justify broadcast regulation on thc basis of the impact thcory [the broadcast media must bc found to bc more persuasive than print mcdia] (Rossini, 1985:841) .
However, proof that television is unique in having such a powcrful effect, and proof of the cxtcnt of the causality or effectivcncss of such a force "in the formation of collective attitudes, valucs and aspirations", are not available in the literature. The acceptance of thc notion that broadcast media an: more persuasive than print mcdia and thus have a grcatcr impact on Canadian socicty nccds testing. Empirical evidcnce to satisfy onc such test would have to show both that broadcast media have a grcatcr effect on human bchaviour and that broadcast audicnccs havc a pcatcr political and social influcncc than rcadcrs of print. Even if empirical cvidcnce were to establish both of those points, thcrc is still a question whcthcr hey afford a sufficient rationale for the regulation of broadcast content. Thc argumcnt in favour of doing so appcxs to amount to asscrling that the pcrsuasivcncss of thc broadcast media justifics regulation by thc statc in thc public intcrcst Yct, if that is thc solc thrust of thc argument, it provcs both too much and too litdc. If the argurncnt is correct. thcn surcly any mcdium which has a significant impact upon the public. particularly thc public's ability to reach informcd opinion, should bc subjcct to statc regulation, evcn ncwspapcrs and magiuincs. Convcrscly, if we rccoil from regulating ncwspapcrand magazine contcnt, thcn it is qucstionablc to regulate the broadcast mcdia solcly on thc ground that they have a grcatcr impact upon the public and that therefore it is "in the public intcrcst" to regulate thc contcnt of the product of those media?
Convergence
Inconsistency in the application of a principle to different modes of communication produccs a conundrum when technological advanccs produce a convcrgencc of two or more modes. For example, if it bccomcs economically fcasible and profitable t o "dclivcr" the daily newspaper's news and advertising contents to the residcnccs of a community by means of a cable tclcvision channcl. the lawmakcrs and Lhe courts must dccidc how to reconcile the diverse rules that have bccn developed for Lhe print media and the broadcasting media separately. The prcscnt revolutionary era of technological advanccs -what Pool has described as "an electronic revolution as Profound as that of printing" -has produccd a "convergence of modes". Writing in The phnse 'communications policy' rings oddly in a discussion of heedom from govcmmcnt. But frcedom is also a policy. Thc question it poses is how to rcduce the public control of communications in an electronics era. Apolicy of frccdom aims at pluralism of cxpression rather than at dissemination of prcfcrrcd idcas ... (Pool, 1983: 8) Pool has idcntificd a fundamental issue that may ultimately, in both Canada and thc Unitcd Statcs. necessitate a thorough rc-thinking of [he policies of regulation and of the consdtutional rulcs applicable to thcm. In both countrics we would expect the "convcrgcncc of modcs" to point toward a rcjcction of the view, hercmfore orthodox in thc U.S. at Icast, that diffcrcnt mcdia invitc different standards of review of the statutory rcylation of contcnt, in terms of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech or frccdom of cxprcssion. Bcyond that, it is morc problematic to foresee which of thc following altcrnativcs would find judicial favour in the intcrprctation of those constitutional provisions: (1) thc vaditional rcjcction of any state rcgulation of the contcnt of thc production of the print mcdia, (2) assimilation of the reylation of the print mcdia with thc lcsscr standard of rcvicw applicd by American courts to off-air broadcasting, or (3) somc mcdian that rcjects sbu: rcgulation of the contents of a spccific prcscntation but permits statc rcgulation of ccrlain classcs of content.
Conclusions
This papcr has atccmptcd m compare a number of aspects of broadcast regulation in Canada and the Unitcd Slatcs. In the proccss we have examined some of the rationales undcrlying regulation of broadcasting generally, and of the content of programs in particular. We have scen that in the United States the "fairness doctrine" is a controversial cxamplc of content regulation, while in Canada Canadian-content rulcs arc a striking form of rcgulation of content. In both countries, the following points apply: The conccpt that thc airwaves arc public property and that a licensee is a "trustee" or "fiduciary" cannot. in itself, justify content regulation. Nor can such rcgulation be justified by thc lhcory that broadcast media have a persuasive impact upon the public significantly grcater than that of print media and that therefore broadcast mcdia should be regulated in the public interest or to serve what are pcrccivcd as national goals.
Bcyond that wc have attcrnpted to show that tcchnological advances in radio and tclcvision off-air broadcasting have not rcndcrcd the spectrum scarcity theory obsolctc; nor docs thc multiplication of other information and opinion dclivery systems contribute to such obsolesccncc. In contending against those arguments wc have. however, questioned content-regulation bascd upon invalid arguments. Wc have noted the significance of the "convergence" of technological resources, which will blur the already artificial distinction that has been drawn between the broadcast media and the print media in terms of constitutional protection of'freedom of speech or freedom of expression.
1
The implications of thc recent Canadian Constitutional amendment have been I cxamined in terms of possible judicial invalidation of well-established grounds and ' methods of regulation of broadcasting. Even if such invalidation should prove not to be the result of Canadian constitutional litigation. the vcry analysis of the ways in which the state regulates broadcasting, in the light of the purposes of the Canadian Chartcr of Rights and Freedoms, is intrinsically of value in an era when deregulation as a matter of government policy is a subject of public discussion. We have seen that I for half a century Canadian government policy has favoured a broadcasting system in which the state itself plays an important broadcasting function of which there is no counterpart in the United States, and that some Canadian content rcgulation has reflected national goals that have no counterpart in the Unilcd States. In the past these Canadian objectives have justilicd not only a broadcasting system with a strong public component, but also a dcgrce of state contcnt regulation that would likely astound American observers. Whilc Canadians have accepted such regulation in thc past as an instrument of preservation of Canadian sovereignty. the validity of such regulation in the furtherance of that objective may bc qucstioncd today in the light of the Charter of Rights at the very timc that cmcrgcnce of new consumer dclivcrysystems may render contcnt regulation of broadcasting relatively ineffective in fostering Canada's sovereignty and Canadian's sense of national identity.
